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a b s t r a c t
Searchable encryption (SE) is a promising technique which enables cloud users to conduct
search over encrypted cloud data in a privacy-preserving way, especially for the electronic
health record (EHR) system that contains plenty of medical history, diagnosis, radiology
images, etc. In this paper, we focus on a more practical scenario, also named as the
shared multi-owner settings, where each e-health record is co-owned by a fixed number
of parties. Although the existing SE schemes under the unshared multi-owner settings
can be adapted to this shared scenario, these schemes have to build multiple indexes,
which definitely incur higher computational overhead. To save bandwidth and computing
resources in cloud servers and guarantee the correctness of search results, we present a
secure cryptographic primitive, namely verifiable conjunctive keyword search overmobile
e-health cloud scheme, in the shared multi-owner settings by utilizing multisignatures
technique. Formal security analysis proves that our scheme is secure against the keyword
guessing attacks in standardmodel. Empirical study using a real-world dataset justifies that
our scheme is efficient and feasible in practical applications.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing [1,2] enables cloud clients to remotely store their data in the cloud server so as to reduce the local data
storage and management burden. However, it also introduces side effects such that the sensitive information contained in
the data may be leaked to the cloud service provider (CSP) or the attackers. To protect data security and privacy [3,4], the
sensitive data should be encrypted before outsourcing. Nevertheless, the encryption-before-outsourcing mechanismmakes
the retrieval [5–9] over encrypted data extremely difficult, especially for the EHR system [10] that contains a large number of
medical diagnosis and treatment documents.With the prevalence of cloud computing, EHRs are commonly used by patients,
doctors and other healthcare professionals in order to reduce the healthcare costs and provide efficient healthcare services.
However, in the semi-trusted cloud environment, data security and privacy concerns will be enlarged as EHRs may contain
sensitive information and are likely to suffer from potential data compromise and privacy disclosure. To balance the conflicts
between data privacy and usability, the public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme [11], which enables
data users to securely search and selectively retrieve records of interest according to the user-specified keywords, has been
proposed and gained extensive research attentions.
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Fig. 1. Sharedmulti-owner settings.
Mobile cloud computing [12,13] which is a specific field of cloud computing always considers the resource constrained
devices, i.e., mobile terminals and sensor nodes, and it usually includes the front-end users who possess mobile devices and
the back-end cloud servers. By integrating the cloud computing and mobile devices, mobile cloud computing enables data
users to access the large volume of cloud storage resources. Due to the limited resources of mobile devices, it is of prime
importance to provide an efficient encrypted EHR search solution in mobile cloud computing.
In most of traditional SE schemes, the cloud server is always considered as a honest-but-curious entity which honestly
follows the established protocols and returns the correct search results, but can deduce some sensitive information from
access patterns and search patterns. However, in commercial cloud computing environment, the CSP is assumed to be a semi-
honest-but-curious [14] third-party which may execute a fraction of search operations and return a fraction of false search
results under various motivations. To overcome this problem, the PEKS schemes should be equipped with a verification
mechanism such that the correctness of search results can be guaranteed without decrypting ciphertexts. Hence, various
verifiable SE schemes [8,15–18] have been extensively studied among academical and industrial fields. Meanwhile, the
computational overhead of results verification should be as small as possible such that the SE schemes can be widely used
in mobile cloud computing.
Obviously, a practical search system in cloud has to support multiple data owners (or multi-owner) [19,20]. In fact,
depending onwhether each record is owned by a single party or co-owned by a fixed number of parties,multi-owner settings
can be further classified into two scenarios, namely unsharedmulti-owner [19,20] and sharedmulti-owner [21,22], andmost
of the existing verifiable SE schemes only focus on the unsharedmulti-owner settings [18] rather than the shared one. Indeed,
the sharedmulti-owner settings aremore common in practical applications, especially in e-health systems. For example, each
EHR is co-owned by a certain patient and several hospital staffs (i.e., surgeon, physician, chemist), and each of the staffs is
responsible for the content of a particular part (i.e., block), as shown in Fig. 1. Notably, although the unsharedmulti-owner
schemes can be applied if each block is viewed as an independent record, it will inevitably run into multiple indexes, each
of which corresponds to a single block, such that the computational and space overhead is extremely expanded. Otherwise,
the multiple data owners need to own the same random element, which is not feasible in the actual applications. Instead,
a scheme specially designed for the shared multi-owner settings only requires a single index for the whole record, which
significantly saves time and space costs.
On the other hand, to check the correctness of data stored in CSP, Wang et al. [23] proposed a public verification
mechanism to audit the integrity of multi-owner data with multisignatures technique. Unfortunately, the scheme cannot
guarantee data searchability. To the best of our knowledge, there are no schemes that support both searchability and
verifiability in ciphertexts simultaneously under the sharedmulti-owner scenario shown in Fig. 1.
Moreover, a practical verifiable SE scheme should support conjunctive keyword search [24–26], as single keyword
search [27,28] will return many irrelevant search results and definitely bring down user search experience.
In order to provide all aforementioned functionalities, we present a Verifiable Conjunctive Keyword Search scheme over
mobile e-health cloud in the sharedMulti-owner settings (VCKSM) by utilizing a third-party auditor [29,30]. Different from
the previously proposed SE schemes, our scheme can resist the off-line keyword guessing attacks [31] in standard model.
Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) Different from the traditional unsharedmulti-owner SE schemes, our scheme can support both results verification and
conjunctive keyword search in the sharedmulti-owner settings.
(2) We evaluate the performance of our scheme by using a real-world dataset and show its efficiency and feasibility in
mobile cloud computing. The results verification overhead mainly depends on the number of search results rather
than the whole data collection.
(3) We formally prove that our scheme is secure against the off-line keyword guessing attacks in standard model.
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Table 1
Functional comparison.
Schemes SRV CKS SMO
CP-VABKS [16] ✓ ✗ ✗
VCKS [17] ✓ ✓ ✗
ABKS-UR [18] ✓ ✓ ✗
Re-dtPECK [24] ✗ ✓ ✗
VCKSM ✓ ✓ ✓
‘‘SRV’’: Search Results Verification.
‘‘CKS’’: Conjunctive Keyword Search.
‘‘SMO’’: Sharedmulti-owner settings.
2. Related work
The SE technique enables CSP to provide fundamental information retrieval services for the cloud clients in a privacy-
preserving way. Since Boneh et al. [11] proposed the first asymmetric SE scheme, abundant works [27,32] focusing on single
keyword search have been proposed. However, these single keyword schemes suffer from a key limitation that too many
undifferentiated anduseless search results are returned,which also lead to thewaste of bandwidth and computing resources.
To address this limitation, Yang et al. [24] presented a novel conjunctive keyword search scheme which enabled data owner
to delegate the flexible access permissions to data users with time enabled proxy re-encryption function. Xia et al. [33]
demonstrated a multi-keyword (conjunctive and disconjunctive keyword) ranked search scheme by utilizing the widely-
used vector space model and TF×IDF model. Later, a considerable number of SE schemes focusing on enriching the search
efficiency [34–36] have been proposed to improve user search experience. However, all the aforementioned schemes cannot
verify the authenticity of search results in the semi-honest-but-curious cloud environment.
To the best of our knowledge, the most of existing SE schemes assume that the CSP is a honest-but-curious entity which
will not deviate from the established protocols or return incorrect search results. However, such an assumption is usually
insufficient in practice as the partial trust CSP is provided by the third-party and may intentionally return incorrect search
results under various motivations. For instance, in order to save computing and bandwidth resources, the semi-honest-but-
curious CSPmay execute a part of search operations or return a fraction of false search results. To tackle this challenge, Zheng
et al. [16] developed a verifiable keyword search scheme through attribute-based encryption (ABE) [37,38] and Bloom Filter,
but this scheme will incur high false positive rate due to the inherent defect of Bloom filter. Later, Fu et al. [8] presented a
semantic keyword search scheme which not only supported the verifiability of search results but also returned the results
that semantically matched the submitted keyword, but one defect of this schemewas the high communication overhead. To
boost search efficiency and gain a broad range of applications in practice, Sun et al. [17] constructed an efficient verifiable
conjunctive keyword search scheme over large dynamic encrypted cloud data. However, these aforementioned schemes
only support the single-contributor scenario where the outsourced data is encrypted and managed by a single data owner.
In practice, the CSP serves multiple data owners to share the benefits brought by mobile cloud computing. In the
traditional unshared multi-owner settings, each data owner encrypts and manages his own data independently. That is,
each data record stored in the cloud is owned by a single data owner. To cater for the multi-data source settings, Li et al. [19]
proposed a fine-grained data access control in multi-owner settings scheme which can reduce key distribution complexity
by leveraging ABE. Sun et al. [18] presented the first attribute-based keyword search scheme with user revocation and fine-
grained search authorization. Zhang et al. [39] dealt with the problem of privacy-preserving ranked multi-keyword search
in multi-owner model. However, these schemes only focus on the unshared multi-owner settings, where each data record
is owned by different data owners. When applied in the sharedmulti-owner settings where a data record is kept by a group
of data owners, these schemes will incur additional indexes and high computational overhead. Furthermore, these schemes
cannot still guarantee the correctness of search results.
Notably, there are no existing schemes that can achieve both results verification and conjunctive keyword search in the
shared multi-owner settings, as shown in the Table 1. From Table 1, we notice that the CP-VABKS [16] and Re-dtPECK [24]
schemes just support SearchResults Verification (SRV, for short) or ConjunctiveKeyword Search (CKS, for short), respectively.
Although the better VCKS [17] and ABKS-UR [18] schemes can simultaneously support SRV and CKS, these schemes will run
into multiple indexes in the Shared Multi-Owner (SMO, for short) settings due to the different random elements. However,
in our proposed scheme, the index building has nothing to do with the random elements selected by multiple data owners.
3. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce a group of cryptography concepts as the basic of VCKSM.
Let G1,G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of group G1, and e be the bilinear map
G1 × G1 → G2. Given a set X , the symbol x ∈R X is defined as choosing an element x uniformly at random from the set X ,
[1, n] is denoted as a series of integers {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n is a non-zero integer.
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Fig. 2. System model of our scheme.
Definition 1 (DDH Problem). Let G1 be a cyclic group of order p, and g be a generator of G1. Given a tuple (g, ga, gb) and an
element Z ∈R G1, the DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman) problem is to decide whether Z equals to gab or to a random element
in G1.
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). Let G1 be a cyclic group of order p, g be a generator of G1. Given the tuple ga, gb ∈R G1 and
randomly selected elements a, b ∈R Z∗p , it is computationally infeasible to compute gab ∈R G1 for any probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversary Awith a negligible advantage ϵ, where the A’s advantage in breaking the CDH (Computational Diffie-
Hellman) problem is defined as Pr[ACDH (g, ga, gb) = gab] < ϵ.
Definition 3 (DLAssumption). LetG1 be a group of order p, and g be the generator ofG1. For any PPT adversaryA, its advantage
in solving the DL (Discrete Logarithm) problem in group G1 is negligible, which is defined as Pr[A(g, ga) = a] < ϵ, where
a ∈R Z∗p .
4. Problem formulation
4.1. System model and threat model
In this paper we consider an mobile e-health cloud system which mainly involves four entities, namely multiple data
owners (patient and his doctors), Cloud Service Provider (CSP), data user (other authorized doctors or healthcare center)
and Private Audit Server (PAS), as demonstrated in Fig. 2, where the unmentioned Trusted Third-Party (TTP) server is in
charge of the system initialization and key generation. Once the system is set up, the TTP does not need to stay online. The
role of each main entity is shown as follows:
• Multiple data owners: For each EHR owned by a specific patient and his doctors, it is extracted with keywords and
is built with index, and then each of its data owners generates a signature on this record, finally the indexes and
signatures are sent to CSP. Note that the detailed algorithm used to encrypt each EHR is beyond the scope of our
discussion, any public key encryption algorithm can be applied.
• CSP: The cloud server that has expertise and capabilities can provide data storage and retrieval services for the
authorized cloud clients (data owner and data user), while it is curious to deduce the sensitive information available
to it and selfish to return false search results under various motivations.
• Data user: Once gaining the authorization from the data owners, he can issue search query for his interested EHRs by
submitting his trapdoor (search token) to CSP.
• PAS: This fully trusted server is responsible for verifying the correctness of search results.
Similar to the literature [14], the CSP is assumed to be semi-honest-but-curious. That is, it honestly performs a fraction of
search operations but is curious to spy out the sensitive information that is valuable for the CSP. Furthermore, it may return
the false search results to save the computing resources. On the other hand, the PAS is fully-trusted and able to guarantee
the correctness of search results. Besides, the authorized data user can issue search queries without leaking any valuable
information to CSP.
4.2. Design goals
Our scheme for mobile e-health cloud is designed to achieve the following goals:
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• Results verification. As the semi-honest-but-curious CSP may return the false search results, which compromises
data security and seriously affects the search experience, our scheme should be equipped with a results verification
mechanism to ensure the correctness of search results.
• Conjunctive keyword search. To search the EHRs quickly and avoid thewaste of bandwidth and computing resources,
our scheme should enable data users to submit multiple keywords in a single search query.
• Efficiency and feasibility. To support a broad range of applications in mobile cloud computing, the performance of
our scheme over a real-world dataset should be efficient and feasible without incurring extra computational burden
on the resource constrained data users.
• Security goals. For the security concerns, our scheme should guarantee both data security without loss of confiden-
tiality. Besides, as the keywords are always selected from a small space and random oracle has its inherent defects,
our scheme should resist the keyword guessing attacks in standard model. Furthermore, our proposed scheme can
correctly check the correctness of search results for the semi-honest-but-curious CSP.
4.3. Security model
As the keyword space is always small, the outside attack may utilize this weakness to exhaustively guess some candidate
keywords and verify whether his guess is right or not. Moreover, the trapdoor indistinguishability is a sufficient condition
for guaranteeing the security against the off-line keyword guessing attacks. That is, the outside attacker who has gained the
trapdoors for challenged keywords still cannot deduce the relationship between the trapdoors and any keyword.
Definition 4 (IND-KGA Security). If there is no adversary A that can break our scheme with a negligible advantage
AdvIND−KGAA (1k), then our scheme is secure against the keyword guessing attacks.
LetAbe anoutside adversarywhich can issueKGA, and kbe the security parameter, then the IND-KGA (Indistinguishability
against Keyword Guessing Attacks) [31] game between the challenger B and A is shown as follows:
• Setup: B first calls the Setup(1k) algorithm and KeyGen(pk,U) algorithm to generate the public/secret key pairs
{(pku, sku), (pks, sks)} for a specific data user u and the CSP, respectively. Then, B sends pku, pks to A, while sku, sks
are unknown to A.
• Query phase 1: A issues the following queries:
– TrapGen oracle: A can adaptively ask B for the search token TW ′ of any keyword set W ′ of his interest, and B
responds to it by performing TrapGen(pk, pks, sku,W ′) algorithm.
• Challenge: A submits two keyword sets W ′0,W ′1 on which it wishes to be challenged, but the restriction is that TW ′0
and TW ′1 have not been queried byA inQuery phase 1. Then B selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the trapdoor
TW ′b .• Query phase 2: A still makes a number of search queries to the TrapGen oracle as in Query phase 1, but there is a
restriction thatW ′0,W
′
1 are not queried to TrapGen oracle.• Guess. A outputs his guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the IND-KGA game if b′ = b; otherwise, it fails.
A’s advantage in breaking the IND-KGA game is denoted as AdvIND−KGAA (1k) = |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |, and our scheme is secure
against the IND-KGA if the advantage AdvIND−KGAA (1k) is negligible.
5. The proposed VCKSM
In this section, we first formally give the definitions of VCKSM scheme as well as some notations used in our scheme, as
shown in the Table 2. Afterwards, we describe the concrete construction of our VCKSM scheme in detail.
5.1. Definition of VCKSM
Our scheme is a tuple of six algorithms which are shown as follows:
• Setup(1k)→ pk: Given the security parameter k, TTP outputs the public parameters pk.
• KeyGen(pk,U,O) → {pks, sks, pku, sku, pkt , skt}: For the data owner set O, data user set U and cloud server, TTP
generates the public/secret key pairs {pkt , skt}(1 ≤ t ≤ d), {pku, sku} and (pks, sks), respectively, where u ∈ U .• Enc(pk, F ,W , ID, {skt}, pks, pku) → {I, C, Sig}: Given the files F and keyword fields W , the data owners output the
ciphertexts C , indexes I and signatures Sig .
• TrapGen(pk, pks, sku,W ′)→ TW ′ : Given the queried keyword setW ′, a specific data user generates the search token
TW ′ .• Search(pk, TW ′ , I, C, sks) → C ′: After gaining the search token TW ′ , the CSP tries to find a match within the index set
I and returns the relevant ciphertext set C ′ to PAS.
• Verify(pk, C ′, ID′, {pkt})→ {0, 1}: After receiving the search results C ′, the PAS outputs ‘‘1’’ when C ′ passes the results
verification mechanism; otherwise, it outputs ‘‘0’’.
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Table 2
Notation descriptions.
Notations Descriptions
O = {O1, . . . ,Od} Multiple data owners for each record
(pks, sks) Public/secret key pair for CSP
(pkt , skt ) Public/secret key pair for data owner
(pku, sku) Public/secret key pair for data user
F = {f1, . . . , fn} Record set
ID = {id1, . . . , idn} Identity set for F
C = {c1, . . . , cn} Ciphertext set for F
W = {w1, . . . , wm} Keyword fields for each record
sigi,t Data owner Ot ’ signature for fi
sigi Data owners’ multisignatures for fi
Sig = {sigi, . . . , sign} Signature set for F
Ii Index for fi
I = {Ii, . . . , In} Index set for F
W ′ = {w′l , . . . , w′l } Queried keyword set
TW ′ Search token forW ′
C ′ = {c ′1, . . . , c ′q} Search results
ID′ = {id′1, . . . , id′q} Identity set for C ′{τ , πτ }τ∈[1,q] Challenging information
(ϕ, σ ) Proof information
5.2. Construction of VCKSM
In the EHR system, each EHR can be encrypted by the traditional public key encryption algorithm, which is beyond the
scope of our discussion. The algorithms in the following mainly focus on how to build indexes and generate signatures
for EHRs so that the conjunctive keyword search query from a specific data user can be processed efficiently in the cloud
system and the PAS can check the correctness of the search results, respectively. For ease of the following discussion, we
define a function ρ(·) which maps the subscript in the set [1, q] to its corresponding subscript in the set [1, n], namely
ρ(τ )|τ∈[1,q] ∈ [1, n].
Setup(1k): Given the security parameter k, TTP first outputs the public bilinear map parameters (G1,G2, e, p, g). Then,
it selects two hash functions h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p . Finally, it sets the public parameters pk as
pk = {G1,G2, e, p, g, h1, h2}.
KeyGen(pk,U,O): According to our systemmodel defined in Section 4, each EHR is owned by a fixed number of data owners,
namely O = {O1, . . . ,Od}, then TTP generates the public/secret key pairs for CSP, data owner set O and data user set U ,
respectively.
For CSP, it first selects two elements α ∈R G1, as ∈R Z∗p and computes β = gas , then the CSP’s public/secret key pair is
denoted as pks = (α, β), sks = as. For each data owner Ot ∈ O(t ∈ [1, d]), it chooses an element xt ∈R Z∗p and computes
Xt = gxt , then it sets the public/secret key pair of Ot as pkt = gxt , skt = xt . While for a specific data user u ∈ U who
is authorized by O, the generation of public/secret key pair is similar to each data owner. This algorithm first selects an
element y ∈R Z∗p and computes Y = gy, then it sets the public/secret key pair of the specific data user u as pku = Y , sku = y.
Enc(pk, F ,W , ID, {skt}, pks, pku): Given the EHR set F = {f1, . . . , fn} with corresponding identities ID = {id1, . . . , idn}, it
will be encrypted as the ciphertext set C = {c1, . . . , cn}. For each EHR fi ∈ F (i ∈ [1, n]) with identity idi, each data owner
Ot ∈ O generates his signature sigi,t = (h1(idi)gh2(ci))xt , and the multisignatures generated by multiple data owners are set
as sigi =∏dt=1sigi,t , where t ∈ [1, d].
Besides, the index for each EHR fi is generated according to the keyword fields W = {w1, . . . , wm}. First, a m-degree
polynomial should be constructed by the equation F(x) = bmxm + bm−1xm−1 + · · · + b1x+ b0 so that yh2(w1), . . . , yh2(wm)
are the m roots of the equation F(x) = 1. Then, select λ,µ ∈R Z∗p and compute Ii,1 = γ · e(g, g)−µ, Ii,2 = gλ,
νi,j = gµ·bj (0 ≤ j ≤ m), where γ = e(β, α)λ.
Finally, data owners’ signature set Sig = {sigi, . . . , sign}, index set I = {Ii, . . . , In} and the ciphertext set C are sent to CSP,
where Ii = {Ii,1, Ii,2, νi,0, νi,1, . . . , νi,m}.
TrapGen(pk, pks, sku,W ′): Given the queried keywords set W ′ = {w′r}(r ∈ [1, l]), a specific data user u first selects two
elements θ, η ∈R Z∗p and sets TW ′,o1 = θ . Then, he computes TW ′,o2 = gη , TW ′,j = g l
−1·TW ′,1·yj·
∑l
r=1h2(w′r )j ·βη , where 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
Finally, he sends the search token (trapdoor) TW ′ = {TW ′,o1 , TW ′,o2 , TW ′,0, TW ′,1, . . . , TW ′,m} to CSP.
Search (pk, TW ′ , I, C, sks): After gaining the search token TW ′ , the CSP first computes γ = e(Ii,2, α)as and verifies whether
Eq. (1) holds or not. If Eq. (1) (described in the following) holds, the CSP returns the relevant ciphertext set C ′ = {c ′1, . . . , c ′q}
and its corresponding identity set ID′ = {id′1, . . . , id′q} to PAS; otherwise, it returns ⊥. The specific search process is shown
in the Algorithm 1. The specific search process is shown in the Algorithm 1. At the beginning, given the trapdoor TW ′ and the
index Ii for each record fi(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the CSP preprocesses the search query with performing m exponentiation operations
(Lines 4-6). Afterwards, the CSP checks whether the submitted trapdoor matches with the index Ii by checking the Eq. (1).
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Algorithm 1 Search over encrypted data
Input: Trapdoor TW ′ , indexes I , ciphertexts C , secret key sks and public parameters pk.
Output: Search results C ′ with corresponding identity set ID′ or⊥.
1: TW ′ = {TW ′,o1 , TW ′,o2 , TW ′,0, TW ′,1, · · · , TW ′,m};
2: I = {I1, · · · , In},Ii = {Ii,1, Ii,2, νi,0, νi,1, · · · , νi,m};
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
4: for 0 ≤ j ≤ m do
5: Compute
∏m
j=0 e(νi,j, TW ′,j/T
as
W ′,o2 );
6: end for
7: Check I
TW ′ ,o1
i,1 ·
∏m
j=0 e(νi,j, TW ′,j/T
as
W ′,o2 )
?= γ TW ′ ,o1 (1);
8: If Eq.1 holds, CSP returns the ciphertext ci; otherwise, it returns⊥;
9: end for
10: CSP returns the relevant results C ′ with corresponding identity set ID′ or⊥ to PAS.
Algorithm 2 Search results verification
Input: Search results C ′ with corresponding identity set ID′ , public keys {pkt } and public parameters pk.
Output: ‘‘Accept" or ‘‘Reject".
1: C ′ = {c ′1, · · · , c ′q}, ID′ = {id′1, · · · , id′q};
2: {pk1, · · · , pkd};
3: PAS sends the challenging information {τ , πτ }τ∈[1,q] to CSP;
4: for 1 ≤ τ ≤ q do
5: Compute ϕ =∑qτ=1 πτ h2(c ′τ );
6: Compute σ =∏qτ=1(sig ′τ )πτ ;
7: Send (ϕ, σ ) to PAS;
8: Compute
∏q
τ=1 h1(id
′
τ )
πτ ;
9: end for
10: for 1 ≤ t ≤ d do
11: Compute
∏d
t=1 pkt
12: end for
13: Check e(σ , g) ?= e(∏qτ=1 h1(id′τ )πτ · gϕ ,∏dt=1 pkt ) (2);
14: If Eq.2 holds, output ‘‘Accept" and send C ′ to data user; otherwise, output ‘‘Reject".
If the Eq. (1) holds, CSP returns the corresponding ciphertext ci; otherwise, he returns⊥ (Lines 7-8). Finally, the CSP returns
the whole relevant ciphertext sets C ′ = {c ′1, . . . , c ′q} and its corresponding identity set ID′ = {id′1, . . . , id′q} or⊥ (Lines 9-10)
to PAS. As the value of m is very small in practice, the Algorithm 1 will not exert heavy computational burden for CSP. Thus,
the search algorithm is feasible and practical in actual scenarios.
I
TW ′,o1
i,1 ·
m∏
j=0
e(νi,j, TW ′,j/T
as
W ′,o2 ) = γ
TW ′,o1 . (1)
Verify(pk, C ′, ID′, {pkt}): After receiving the search results C ′, the PAS first selects an element πτ ∈R Z∗p for each encrypted
EHR c ′τ (τ ∈ [1, q]). Then, it sends the challenging information {τ , πτ }τ∈[1,q] to CSP. After gaining the challenging information,
the CSP first computes ϕ =∑qτ=1πτh2(c ′τ ) and σ =∏qτ=1(sig ′τ )πτ . Then, it sends the proof information (ϕ, σ ) to PAS, where
sig ′τ =
∏d
t=1sigρ(τ ),t . Finally, the PAS verifies whether Eq. (2) holds.
e(σ , g) = e
( q∏
τ=1
h1(id′τ )
πτ · gϕ,
d∏
t=1
pkt
)
. (2)
In the above equation, id′τ = idρ(τ ), c ′τ = cρ(τ ). If Eq. (2) holds, the PAS justifies that the search results C ′ are correct and sends
them to the specific data user u; otherwise, it aborts. The detailed process of results verification can be found in Algorithm 2.
At the beginning, the PAS interacts with the CSP based on the challenge–response mode (Lines 3-9). Afterwards, the PAS
computes
∏d
t=1pkt and verifies whether the search results C
′ is correct or not (Lines 10-13). Finally, the PAS draws the
conclusion and returns the correct search results to the specific data user (Line 14).
Remark: If the specific data user is authorized and his queried keywords set satisfies W ′ ⊆ W , the CSP will return the
relevant search results C ′ to PAS. And the search results C ′ can pass the results verification mechanism only if the CSP does
not tamper or forge incorrect search results.
6. Analysis of our scheme
In this section, we present the analysis our scheme in terms of correctness, security and performance, respectively.
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6.1. Correctness
In our VCKSM scheme, the specific data users can gain the desired search results if and only if his submitted keyword set
satisfies W ′ ⊆ W and its corresponding search token matches with the indexes. In addition, the data users can be assured
of the correctness of search results if the search results pass the results verification mechanism performed by PAS.
Theorem 1. For any security parameter k, the proposed VCKSM scheme satisfies
Search→
{
1, W ′ ⊆ W
0, Otherwise ,Verify→
{
1, C ′ ⊆ C
0, Otherwise.
Proof 1. For Eq. (1), we first have
I
TW ′,o1
i,1 = e(β, α)λθ · e(g, g)−µθ .
Based on F(x), then
m∏
j=0
e(νi,j,
TW ′,j
T asW ′,o2
) =
m∏
j=0
e
(
gµ·bj , g l
−1·θ ·yj·∑lr=1 h2(w′r )j)
= e
(
gµ, g l
−1θ
)∑m
j=0 bj·yj·
∑l
r=1 h2(w′r )j
= e(g, g)µθ .
Thus, we finally check that Eq. (1) holds whenW ′ ⊆ W .
I
TW ′,o1
i,1 ·
m∏
j=0
e(νi,j, TW ′,j/T
as
W ′,o2 ) = e(β, α)λθ = γ
TW ′,o1 .
For Eq. (2), we can check that it holds when id′τ = idρ(τ ), c ′τ = cρ(τ ).
e(σ , g) = e
( q∏
τ=1
d∏
t=1
sigπτρ(τ ),t , g
)
= e
( q∏
τ=1
h1(id′τ )
πτ · g
∑q
τ=1 h2(c′τ )πτ ,
d∏
t=1
pkt
)
= e
( q∏
τ=1
h1(id′τ )
πτ · gϕ,
d∏
t=1
pkt
)
.
6.2. Security
For security issue, IND-KGA, as known to all, can ensure that the outsider attacker cannot infer the relationship between
the target trapdoor and challenging keyword set even though it can gain other trapdoors, and the IND-KGA security can be
guaranteed by our VCKSM scheme, which is shown as below.
Theorem 2. Our scheme is secure against IND-KGA in standard model on the condition that DDH problem is intractable
(Definition 1).
Proof 2. If there is a PPT adversaryA that can break the IND-KGA security of our schemewith the probability (ϑ, ε), whereϑ ,
ε are denoted as the running time and advantage ofA in breaking the IND-KGA security, respectively. Thenwe construct a PPT
adversary B to break the IND-KGA security of our scheme with the probability (ϑ ′, ε′), where ε′ ≥ ε, ϑ ′ ≥ ϑ + te(2m+ 3)qt ,
te is the running time of an exponentiation, qt is the number of trapdoor queries.
Assume thatA has given a tuple (g, gδ1 , gδ2 , Z) as an instance for the DDH problem, where Z is equal to gδ1·δ2 or a random
element in G1, then the security game between A and B is shown as follows:
• Setup: B first selects α ∈R Z∗p and computes β = gδ2 , the CSP’s public/secret key pair is denoted as pks = (α, β),
sks = δ2, respectively. Then, B chooses y ∈R Z∗p and computes Y = gy, the public/secret key pair of a specific data user
u is set as pku = Y , sku = y. Finally, B sends the tuple (pks, pku) to A.
• Query phase 1: A issues the following queries:
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– TrapGen oracle: A first adaptively issues the search token query for the submitted keyword set W ′i ={w′i,1, . . . , w′i,l}(l ≤ m), then B selects θ, η ∈R Z∗p and computes TW ′i ,o1 = θ , TW ′i ,o2 = gη , TW ′i ,j =
g
l−1·TW ′i ,1·y
j·∑lr=1h2(w′i,r )j · βη , where 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
• Challenge: A outputs two keyword sets W ′0,W ′1 on which to be challenged, B first selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and an element θ∗ ∈R Z∗p . Then, he sets TW ′b,o1 = θ∗, TW ′b,o2 = gδ1 , TW ′b,j = g
l−1·TW ′i ,o1 ·y
j·∑lr=1h2(w∗r )j · Z . Finally,
B sends the trapdoor TW ′b = (TW ′b,o1 , TW ′b,o2 , {TW ′b,j}0≤j≤m) to A. Set η∗ = δ1, if Z = gδ1·δ2 , then TW ′b,o2 = gη
∗
,
TW ′b,j = g
l−1·TW ′i ,o1 ·y
j·∑lr=1h2(w∗r )j · βη∗ . Therefore, TW ′b is the valid search token for the keyword setW ′b.• Query phase 2:A repeats the process inQuery phase 1, but there is one restriction thatW ′0,W ′1 have not been queried.• Guess:A outputs a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, B outputs ‘‘1’’ meaning Z = gδ1·δ2 ; otherwise, it returns ‘‘0’’, which
means that Z is a random element in G1.
In the Guess phase, if A can break our scheme with an advantage ε, then the term gδ1·δ2 will appear in the tuple
(g, gδ1 , gδ2 , gδ1·δ2 ) with the probability 12 + ε at least. In other words, B’s advantage in breaking the DDH problem is at
least ε′ ≥ ε. And B’s execution time ϑ ′ ≥ ϑ + te(2m+ 3)qt of this simulation is mainly decided by the exponent operations
in the query phase. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
In addition, the malicious CSP cannot forge the valid proof information to pass the results verification mechanism, as
shown in Theorem 3.
Theorem3. For CSP, it is computationally infeasible to forge the valid proof information to pass the results verificationmechanism
under the CDH and DL assumptions (Definitions 2 and 3).
Proof 3. To forge the valid proof information, the malicious adversary can achieve it with the following two ways:
• The adversary first forges valid multisignatures on each returned record on behalf of multiple data owners, then
it generates the valid proof information on search results according to the generated multisignatures. However, it
is computationally infeasible to forge valid multisignatures based on the CDH assumption as it does not have the
secret keys of multiple data owners, of which the detailed proof is demonstrated in the literature [23]. Thus, it is
computationally infeasible to forge the valid proof information in this way.
• The adversary can directly generate the valid proof information based on the incorrect search results C∗without forging
multisignatures by winning the following security game.
First, the PAS sends the challenging information {τ , πτ }τ∈[1,q] to CSP. The proof information on correct search results
C ′ should be (ϕ, σ ), while the malicious CSP may forge the proof information (ϕ′, σ ) on false search results C∗, where
ϕ′ = ∑qτ=1πτh2(c∗τ ), C∗ = {c∗τ }τ∈[1,q]. Set ∆ϕ = ϕ′ − ϕ, then ∆ϕ ̸= 0 as ϕ′ ̸= ϕ and the tuple {πτ }τ∈[1,q] is randomly
selected in field Z∗p . If the forged proof information (ϕ′, σ ) can successfully pass the results verification mechanism, the
malicious CSP wins this security game; otherwise, it fails.
Assume that the CSP wins the security game, then we can get e(σ , g) = e(∏qτ=1h1(id′τ )πτ · gϕ′ ,∏dt=1pkt ). In addition,
we can also have e(σ , g) = e(∏qτ=1h1(id′τ )πτ · gϕ,∏dt=1pkt ) based on the proof information on the correct search results C ′.
Finally, we can further gain gϕ
′ = gϕ ⇔ g∆ϕ = 1.
In the cyclic group, given two elements ξ,ϖ ∈ G1, there is at least an element z ∈R Z∗p such thatϖ = ξ z . Without loss
of generality, the generator g can be expressed as g = ξϱ1πϱ2 through ξ,ϖ , where ϱ1, ϱ2 ∈R Z∗p . According to the equation
g∆ϕ = 1 we can get (ξϱ1πϱ2 )∆ϕ = 1 ⇔ ξϱ1∆ϕ · πϱ2∆ϕ = 1. Therefore, given ξ, ξ z we can break the DL problem. This is
because we can have π = ξ−
ϱ1∆ϕ
ϱ2∆ϕ = ξ z unless ϱ2∆ϕ ̸= 0, where z = − ϱ1∆ϕϱ2∆ϕ . However, we know that ∆ϕ ̸= 0 and ϱ2 is a
random element. And the equation ϱ2∆ϕ = 0 holds with only a probability of 1p . Hence, we can break the DL problem with
a probability of 1− 1p , where p is a large prime. That is to say, if the malicious CSP can win the security game, we can solve
the DL problem, which conflicts with the DL assumption in Definition 3. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
6.3. Performance
In this section, we present the performance evaluation regarding the theoretical and practical analysis of our scheme by
comparing with the state-of-the-art ABKS-UR [18] and CP-VABKS [16] schemes. As for the theoretical analysis, we mainly
analyze the storage costs and computational complexities of the aforementioned three schemes. After that, we conduct a
series of experiments using a real-world dataset to show the efficiency and feasibility of our proposed scheme.
Let |G1|, |G2|, |Zp| be the bit-length of an element in groups G1,G2 and field Zp, respectively. It is worth noticing that the
value of keyword fields (m) in EHR is not more than the number of attributes (N ) in the practical applications. From Table 3,
we notice that our scheme has less storage cost than the other two schemes for the Trap and Search algorithms. Besides,
our scheme also has less storage cost than other two schemes for KeyGen algorithm on condition that the number of data
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Table 3
Storage cost in various schemes.
Schemes KeyGen Trap Search Verify
ABKS-UR [18] (U + 1)|Zp| + (2N + 1)|G1| + U|G2| (2N + 1)|G1| + 2|Zp| (N + 2)|G2| —
CP-VABKS [16] (N + 1)|Zp| + (2N + 1)|G1| (2N + 3)|G1| + |Zp| (N + 3)|G2| —
VCKSM (d+ U + 1)(|Zp| + |G1|)+ |G1| (m+ 2)|G1| + 2|Zp| (m+ 3)|G2| + |G1| (q+ 1)|Zp| + |G1| + 2|G2|
‘‘N ’’: Number of attributes; ‘‘U ’’: Number of data users; ‘‘d’’: Number of data owners.
‘‘q’’: Number of search results; ‘‘m’’: Number of keyword fields; ‘‘—’’: Unconsidered.
Table 4
Computational complexity in various schemes.
Schemes KeyGen Enc Trap Search Verify
ABKS-UR [18] (2N + 1)E1 + 2UE2 (N + 1)E1 + E2 (2N + 1)E1 (N + 1)P + E1 —
CP-VABKS [16] (2N + 2)E1 +Nh1 (2N + 4)E1 +Nh1 (2N + 4)E1 (2N + 3)P +NE1 —
VCKSM (U + d+ 1)E1 (m+ 2+ 2d)E1 + h1 + 2P + 2E2 (m+ 2)E1 (m+ 2)P + E1 + 3E2 (2q+ 1)E1 + qh1 + 2P
users is less than 100. As the other two schemes will incur high false positive rate caused by the bloom filter, we just analyze
the storage cost for Verify algorithm in our scheme. Furthermore, our scheme does not yield muchmore storage cost for the
Verify algorithm due to the small value of q. Thus, our scheme is suitable for the lightweight entities.
For the computational complexity, wemainly consider several time-consuming operations, i.e., exponentiation operation
E1 (or E2) in group G1 (or G2), pairing operation P , hash operation h1 which maps an arbitrary bit string to group G1. In
Table 4 we give the computational complexity of our VCKSM scheme by comparing with the state-of-the-art ABKS-UR [18]
and CP-VABKS [16] schemes which are applied in the unsharedmulti-owner settings.
From Table 4, we notice that our scheme is more efficient than the other two schemes for KeyGen, Trap, Search
algorithms except for Enc algorithm. As our scheme needs to generate multiple signatures for each record and conduct
extra exponentiation operations (2dE1), our scheme has higher computational burden than the ABKS-UR scheme for Enc
algorithm. For the KeyGen algorithm, the ABKS-UR scheme requires 2 exponentiation operations (2E2) for each data user as
well as 2N exponentiation operations (2NE1) for the whole attribute set, the CP-VABKS scheme needs 2N exponentiation
operations (2NE1) and N hash operations (Nh1) for the system attributes, while our scheme only needs one (E1) for each
data owner and data user, respectively. Due tom ≤ N , the search time of our scheme is less than that of other two schemes
for Search algorithm. Notice that the ABKS-UR scheme is still superior to CP-VABKS scheme for the KeyGen, Enc, Trap and
Search algorithms. With the same reason shown in Table 3, the results verification time of our scheme for Verify algorithm
is still acceptable due to the small value of q.
To evaluate the actual performance of the aforementioned three schemes, we conduct empirical experiments using a
real-world dataset1 which includes half amillion records from 150 users. This public email dataset used inmany SE schemes
contains half a million records from about 150 users, mostly senior management of Enron, and the Enron corpus contains a
total of about 0.5Mmessage. The experiments are performed on an Ubuntu Server 15.04with Intel Core i5 Processor 2.3 GHz
by using C and PBC Library. In PBC Library, the Type A is denoted as E(Fκ ) : y2 = x3 + x, the groups G1 and G2 of order p are
the subgroups of E(Fκ ), where the parameter p and κ are equivalent to 160 bits and 512 bits respectively. Thus, we can have
|G1| = |G2| = 1024 bits, |Zp| = 160 bits. In line with the ABKS-UR scheme [18], we randomly select 10,000 records from this
dataset and perform experiments for 100 times. For convenience, we set U ∈ [1, 50],m ∈ [1, 100], q ∈ [1, 50]. Note that we
also setN = 100, d = 10 throughout this paper.
In Fig. 3(a), we notice that our scheme has less storage cost than other two schemes with regard to key generation due to
U, d < N . The storage costs of our scheme and the ABKS-UR scheme increasewith the value of U , while that of the CP-VABKS
scheme almost remains unchanged. Besides, the CP-VABKS scheme has less storage cost than the ABKS-UR schemewhen the
variable U increases to a certain value. In Fig. 3(b) we evaluate the key generation time by varying the number of data users.
Obviously, in aforementioned schemes, the computational overhead for KeyGen algorithm increases almost linearly with
the value of U ∈ [1, 50]. Notice that our scheme outperforms the ABKS-UR and CP-VABKS schemes for KeyGen algorithm
regarding the key generation time. As our scheme just needs (U+d+1)E1, while the ABKS-UR scheme and CP-VABKS scheme
need (2N +1)E1+2UE2 and (2N +2)E1+Nh1, respectively. However, the CP-VABKS scheme is less efficient than ABKS-UR
scheme as the exponentiation operation E2 is much more efficient than hash operation h1.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the computational burden of Enc algorithm in these schemes by varying the number of encrypted
records from 1 to 10,000 (e.g., n ∈ [1,10,000]). Obviously, the running time increases with the value of n. The encryption
time of the ABKS-UR and CP-VABKS schemes is also affected by the variable N , while that of our scheme is still influenced
by other two factors m, d, namely the number of keyword fields and the fixed number of data owners for each EHR. For
comparison, we set m = 100 for this algorithm. Notably, the CP-VABKS scheme has much more computational overhead
than the ABKS-UR scheme due to the extra operations (N + 3)E1 + Nh1. Although our scheme has slightly more running
time than the ABKS-UR scheme for the Enc algorithm, it does not affect the user search experience as the Enc algorithm
is performed only in the initialization of the system and is a one-time cost. Thus, our scheme is still acceptable in actual
applications without deteriorating the user search experience.
1 http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/
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Fig. 3. Storage and computational costs in KeyGen algorithm: (a) Storage costs of key generation; (b) Computational costs of key generation.
Fig. 4. Computational costs in Enc algorithm.
In Fig. 5(a), the storage cost of our scheme is (m+2)|G1|+2|Zp|, while that of the ABKS-UR scheme is (2N+1)|G1|+2|Zp|,
and that of the CP-VABKS scheme is (2N + 3)|G1| + |Zp|. However, in practice, the fields of each record are far less than 100,
namely m ≤ N . Thus, our scheme will be inferior to the other two schemes in terms of storage cost for Trap algorithm,
and the storage cost of ABKS-UR scheme is similar to that of CP-VABKS scheme. We show the computational costs for Trap
algorithm in the aforementioned three schemes by varying the value ofm from1 to 100 in Fig. 5(b). As the hash operation h2 is
more efficient than other operations, the computational costs of the aforementioned three schemesmainly depend on values
ofN andm, respectively, rather than the number of submitted keywords. For Trap algorithm, our scheme needs (m+ 2)E1,
while the ABKS-UR and CP-VABKS schemes need (2N + 1)E1 and (2N + 4)E1, respectively. Notice that the computational
cost of our scheme increases almost linearly with m, while that of the other two schemes slightly increase with m. Due to
m ≤ N , our scheme is more efficient than the ABKS-UR and CP-VABKS schemes in terms of trapdoor generation time.
In Fig. 6(a), we notice that our scheme has less storage cost than the other two schemes for Search algorithm because of
m ≤ N , but the storage costs of the ABKS-UR ((N + 2)|G2|) and CP-VABKS ((N + 3)|G2|) schemes are almost approximately
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Fig. 5. Storage and computational costs in Trap algorithm: (a) Storage costs of trapdoor generation; (b) Computational costs of trapdoor generation.
equal. The actual execution time for Search algorithm in aforementioned three schemes is presented in Fig. 6(b). With the
same reason shown in Trap algorithm, we present the computational overhead for Search algorithm by varying the value
of m ∈ [1, 100]. Obviously, our scheme is much efficient than other two schemes in terms of ciphertexts retrieval time
when m < 100. When the value of m is close to 100, the ABKS-UR scheme and our scheme have the similar computational
complexities, but these two schemes havemuch less computational burden than the CP-VABKS scheme for Search algorithm.
To conduct the ciphertexts search operations, our schemeneeds (m+2)P+E1+3E2, and the ABKS-UR and CP-VABKS schemes
need (N + 1)P + E1 and (2N + 3)P +NE1, respectively. For example, when settingm = 100, our scheme needs 554 ms, the
ABKS-UR scheme needs 576 ms, while the CP-VABKS scheme needs 1100 ms. Thus, our scheme can be applied in a broad
range of practical applications.
As the ABKS-UR scheme cannot accurately check the correctness of search results due to high false positive rate caused by
Bloom Filter, we just show the storage cost and verification time of our scheme for Verify algorithm in Fig. 7, respectively.
Then, we notice that the storage and computational costs of Verify algorithm increase with the number of search results
(q ∈ [1, 50]), which are in accord with our discussion in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. Notably, even if q = 50, the storage
cost of this algorithm almost needs 1.1 KB and the verification process only takes 896ms. In addition, this algorithm ismainly
performed by the fully-trusted PAS. In other words, this algorithm will not impose high storage and computational burden
on the data user, especially for resource-limited entities, such as sensor nodes and mobile terminals.
From above figures, we deduce that the actual performance evaluation is completely in accord with the computational
complexity study shown in Tables 3 and4. Comparingwith the state-of-the-art ABKS-UR andCP-VABKS schemes, our scheme
is still efficient and feasible in mobile cloud computing without exerting high computational and storage burden on the
mobile devices.
Besides, the experiments in our scheme are just performed for 100 times. Next, we will evaluate the creditability of
experimental results by using the confidence interval [40]. Table 5 shows the storage and computational costs of our scheme
for different algorithms, where the value of data users is set as U = 50 for KeyGen algorithm, the number of records is set as
10,000 for Enc algorithm, the number of keyword fields is set asm = 100 for Trap and Search algorithms, and the number of
search results is set as q = 50. In conclusion, we can accurately assess the actual performance of our scheme by conducting
the experiments for 100 times.
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Fig. 6. Storage and computational costs in Search algorithm: (a) Storage costs of ciphertexts retrieval; (b) Computational costs of ciphertexts retrieval.
Fig. 7. Storage and computational costs in Verify algorithm of VCKSM scheme.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the first verifiable conjunctive keyword search scheme in amore challengingmodel, which can
guarantee the correctness of search results and support a broad range of practical applications, especially for the mobile
e-health cloud systems. Different from the previously proposed SE schemes, our scheme enables verifiable conjunctive
keyword search over encrypted EHRs, where a single record is kept by a group of data owners. In addition, our scheme can
perfectly fit with the sharedmulti-owner settings in semi-trusted cloud environment by utilizingmultisignatures technique,
and meanwhile a specific data user can be assured with the correctness of search results. The theoretical security analysis
proves that our scheme is secure against the IND-KGA in standard model. For the malicious CSP, it is computationally
infeasible to forge the valid proof information to pass the results verification mechanism. Moreover, empirical study using a
real-world dataset shows that our scheme is efficient and provides good user search experience in mobile cloud computing.
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Table 5
Analysis for experimental results.
Algorithms Results Confidence interval ↓ Confidence interval ↑
KeyGensc (bit) 93408 93245.75 93475.05
KeyGencc (ms) 504.8 497.07 511.93
Enccc (s) 1353 1272.13 1354.47
Trapsc (bit) 115792 115490.34 115804.78
Trapcc (ms) 513 510.52 527.28
Searchsc (bit) 91520 91506.76 91666.44
Searchcc (ms) 554.7 540.01 555.59
Verifysc (bit) 11192 11130.49 11263.71
Verifycc (ms) 896 860.54 916.86
‘‘Results’’: Average value of experimental tests for 100 times.
‘‘sc ’’: Storage cost; ‘‘cc ’’: Computational cost.
‘‘↓’’: Lower limit of confidence interval.
‘‘↑’’: Upper limit of confidence interval.
As part of our future work, we will try to solve the problem of dynamic user updating (i.e., user enrollment and user
revocation) so that our scheme can adaptively deal with the dynamic access control.
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